Campbell Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 2 Spring Symposium 2018

Article 5

2018

Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet
Age: The Ethical Landscape for Judges in the PostWatergate Age
Carolyn A. Dubay

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Carolyn A. Dubay, Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet Age: The Ethical Landscape for Judges in the Post-Watergate Age, 40
Campbell L. Rev. 531 (2018).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.

Dubay: Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet Age: The Ethical

Public Confidence in the Courts in the Internet
Age: The Ethical Landscape for Judges in the
Post-Watergate Era
CAROLYN A. DUBAY*
ABSTRACT

Promoting and protecting public confidence in government
institutions is central to continuedfaith in the rule of law. As a result,
when personal scandals or internalfailures threaten public trust in
government institutions, policy makers have been quick to respond
with new measures to increase accountabilityfor misconduct. In the
twentieth century, the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s led to
significant changes in accountabilityfor misconduct by high-level
public officials and in the legal profession generally. Forjudges, in
the years just prior to Watergate, high-profile scandals involving
federal judges also led to significant changes in the regulation of
judicial conduct. Since the 1970s, however, the types of ethical
challengesfaced by all public officials have become more complex in
the digital age.
This Article explores some of the most common ethical issues
facing judges as they interact in the digital world, from the use of
social media to Internetresearch. To put the emergingjudicial ethics
rules relating to the use of social media and the Internet in context,
this Article lays the foundationforpreservingpublic confidence in the
courts through discussion of the three core values ofjudicial ethicsindependence, integrity, and impartiality-andhow judicial ethics
enforcement evolved in the post- Watergate era with the introduction
of independent judicial enforcement agencies. Looking to recent
disciplinary actions by these agencies involvingjudicial use of social
media and a wave of concern over independentInternet research, this
* Carolyn A. Dubay is the Executive Director of the North Carolina Judicial Standards
Commission. She dedicates this article to the memory of Judge Doug Parsons, a member of
the Commission from 2014 to 2017. The views, ideas, and research contained in this article
are attributable to the author alone and do not reflect the position or work product of the
Judicial Standards Commission.
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Article posits that prophylactic rules regardingsocial media use by
judges are not necessary to maintain public trust and confidence in
the courts. Instead, resort to and strict enforcement of the existing
rules that requirejudges at all times to embrace the core values of
independence, integrity, and impartiality are both sufficient and
adaptable enough to be applied to the variety of disciplinary issues
that can arise when judges engage with the digital world.
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INTRODUCTION

James Madison observed in Federalist No. 51, "Ifmen were angels, no
government would be necessary."' By design, therefore, our federal and
state constitutions separated government functions and created independent
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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institutions, including the judiciary, to protect the people from the danger of
political power consolidated in a single person or faction.2 For this system
to function properly, the public must have confidence that those institutions
will act with integrity, fairness, and efficiency. The task of promoting and
protecting that public confidence is challenging under any circumstances but
becomes especially difficult when scandals arise or when politicians attempt
to delegitimize the institutions empowered to hold them accountable. As
Abraham Lincoln rhetorically asked a group of students in 1838: "[W]hy
suppose danger to our l5olitical institutions?"3 Lincoln then ominously
warned of threats to our democracy from "men of ambition and talents" and
"possessed of the loftiest genius" who would not appreciate or value the
limits on political power embedded in the Constitution. According to
Lincoln, the success of our constitutional democracy depends on a citizenry
that is united, well-educated, and "attached to the government and laws."'
In other words, the public must be educated about the importance of the rule
of law and must have confidence in the ability of our government institutions
to protect the rights and principles of the Constitution.
Since Lincoln's speech in 1838, public confidence in government
institutions has waxed and waned.6 Calculated political attacks, personal
scandals, and the internal failures of institutions themselves have threatened
public trust in the integrity and fairness of public officials at all levels of
government. At the same time, high-profile political scandals have
periodically led to significant changes in the way public officials are held
accountable for misconduct. In the twentieth century, the Watergate scandal
led to the enactment of the federal Ethics in Government Act,7 which
reshaped and challenged the role of the independent prosecutor in

2. Id. ("[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.").
3. Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois
(Jan. 27, 1838), in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 113 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953).
4. Id at 114.
5. Id To build this attachment to a system of government and laws, Lincoln also urged
constant education on the importance of the rule of law: "Let reverence for the laws . . . be
taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges;-let it be written in Primmers, spelling
books, and in Almanacs;-let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls,
and enforced in courts of justice." Id at 112.
6. See Beyond Distrust:How Americans View Their Government, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov.
23, 2015), https://perma.cc/GC26-FYVF (detailing polling on public trust in government
since 1958).
7. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505 (2012)).
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investigating alleged misconduct in the Oval Office. 8 The scandal also
spurred significant changes in ethics requirements for public officials and
professional standards for lawyers. 9
Like officials in the political branches of government, federal and state
judges are not immune from scandal and public criticism. Even so, and as
Francis Bacon mused in his 1612 essay OfJudicature, "The place ofjustice
is an hallowed place ... [which] ought to be preserved without scandal and
corruption."10 Holding individual judges accountable for misconduct raises
special concerns, however. Without a doubt, maintaining public confidence
in the administration of justice demands judges be disciplined for
misconduct, but at the same time, the competing need for judicial
independence demands an accountability process that is free from political
influence. As Alexander Hamilton warned in Federalist No. 78, "[A]ll
possible care is requisite to enable [the judiciary] to defend itself' from
attacks by the political branches of government." Even today, judicial
leaders are quick to respond to concerns about misconduct in the judiciary in
order to protect public confidence in the courts and stave off political
intervention into the sensitive area ofjudicial discipline.1 2 For the judiciary,
8. See generally Constance O'Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Note, FallenAngels, Separation
of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical,
Constitutional, and PoliticalTensions in the Special ProsecutorProvisions of the Ethics in
Government Act, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 113, 115-24 (1982) (discussing use of special
prosecutors and events leading up to the independent prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to the independent counsel provisions in the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978); Mark Stencel, Watergate 25: The Reforms, WASH. PosT (June 13, 1997),
https://perma.cc/2NFM-E3SZ (discussing the numerous "good government" and campaign
finance reforms that followed the Watergate scandal).
9. Tom Goldstein, Watergate Stirs New Look at Lawyers' Self-Policing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1974, at 85 (noting that re-examination of legal ethics began with the American Bar
Association in 1970, but Watergate brought the conduct of government lawyers into the
spotlight, especially with G. Gordon Liddy, John Dean, and Spiro Agnew); see also Mark
Hansen, 1965-1974: Watergate and the Rise of Legal Ethics, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 2015),
https://perma.cc/MSV7-U46J (noting that lack of training on legal ethics prior to Watergate
could have contributed to the issues with the lawyers involved in the scandal) (quoting John
W. Dean IN as saying, "In 1972, legal ethics boiled down to: 'Don't lie, don't cheat, don't
steal[,J and don't advertise"). After Watergate, ABA-accredited law schools were required to
teach legal ethics, the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE) was introduced,
and ethics became a regular part of continuing legal education (CLE). Hansen, supra.
10. SR FRANCIS BACON, OF JUDICATURE (1612), reprintedin THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS
BACON 251, 255 (Mary Augusta Scott ed., 1908).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. See, e.g., C.J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2017 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 11 (2017) (announcing working group to address sexual misconduct by federal
judges amid scandal involving claims of sexual harassment by Judge Alex Kozinski); see also
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therefore, the ethical rules and compliance frameworks that developed in the
post-Watergate era are markedly different from the regulatory structure for
other public officials.
Looking to the present-day challenges to sustaining public confidence
in government institutions, including the courts, the circumstances have
changed dramatically since the 1960s. The types of ethical challenges faced
by all public officials have become more complex in the digital age. As the
business of government (and the courts) increasingly goes digital, and as we
communicate electronically through email, texts, and social media more
often, the ability for sensitive, embarrassing, or confidential information to
be shared instantly with others poses new challenges for maintaining public
trust in the government. Sometimes, nefarious actors, such as Julian Assange
and his "transparency" organization WikiLeaks, publish leaked or hacked
information. Other times, public officials themselves engage with platforms
such as Twitter or Facebook to share information, political commentary, or
other news. The language in these communications has become increasingly
raw, outrageous, and politically charged.
This Article examines how judicial policy makers and disciplinary
agencies have responded to the threat to public confidence in the courts
arising from social media and Internet use by judges. As in other contexts,
expectations of the conduct of judges are drastically different than
expectations of political actors. For example, while a politician can tweet
insults, make wild accusations, and use vulgar language, a judge who uses
offensive and undignified language in a tweet or on Facebook, or who
engages in a public feud with other officials through social media, could
potentially face disciplinary action.1 3 Similarly, while the digital frontier has
offered exceptional opportunities for access to information on the Internet,
judges continue to be bound by the strictures of the adversarial system that
prohibit judges from conducting their own research on disputed factual
issues.14

To put these judicial ethics rules in context, Part I of this Article lays
the foundation for preserving public confidence in the courts through strict
adherence to three core values-independence, integrity, and impartiality. It

infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Breyer Report on implementation of
the federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act). A common threat to the federal courts is the
creation of an Inspector General to oversee the courts. See Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and
Oversight in the FederalCourts: Creatingan Office ofInspector General,35 CAL. W. L. REV.
243, 254 (1999) (noting that the creation of an Inspector General accountable to Congress to
police the federal courts "raises questions involving the separation of powers doctrine and the
effect such an office might have on judicial independence").
13. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section II.B.
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then examines how these core values were shaken by the judiciary's own
"Watergate" moment in a scandal involving Supreme Court Justice Abe
Fortas and the significant changes in judicial ethics enforcement that
followed. Part II then details how contemporary judicial enforcement
agencies and judicial ethics advisory committees have confronted the
potential threats to public confidence in the courts arising from the Internetbased conduct of judges. Looking to recent disciplinary actions involving
social media and a wave of concern over independent Internet research, this
Part evaluates how this conduct undermines the core values of independence,
integrity, and impartiality in the judiciary. Part I11 then posits that while
some states have adopted prophylactic rules regarding social media use by
judges, such restrictions may do more harm than good and thus are a
disproportionate response to the potential threats to public trust in the courts
arising from such conduct. Instead, resort to and strict enforcement of the
existing rules that require judges at all times to embrace the core values of
independence, integrity, and impartiality are both sufficient and adaptable
enough to be applied to the variety of disciplinary issues that can arise when
judges engage with the digital world.
I.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE: TWO SIDES OF
THE SAME COIN

The North Carolina Constitution provides that "frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of
liberty." 5 For the judiciary, those fundamental principles include the basic
tenet that a judge should decide cases independently and impartially and at
all times act with absolute integrity. More than any other institution, these
core values must not only be observed subjectively through the actual
conduct of each individual judge but also objectively through consideration
of the public's perception of the judge's conduct and its impact on public
confidence in the fair administration of justice. For this reason, it is often
said in assessing the conduct ofjudges that perception is reality." And while
there is no comparable Watergate, Whitewater, or WikiLeaks scandal
challenging the judiciary (at least in terms of media coverage), history has
shown that, at times, judges too are no "angels,"" and certain scandals and

15. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 35.
16. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting common proposition that "[i]n matters of ethics, appearance and reality often
converge as one").
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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events have pushed forward much-needed reforms in how judges are held
accountable for misconduct."8
A.

The Trouble with Definitions: What is Public Confidence in the
Judiciary?

For the judiciary, public confidence in the administration of justice is
an ongoing concern. To quote Honor6 de Balzac, "To distrust the judiciary
marks the beginning of the end of society."l 9 As a result, maintaining and
measuring public confidence in the courts features prominently in public
polling, strategic planning, judicial education, operational and procedural
policies, and ethical regulations for judges.2 0 The problem with "public
confidence" as a goal of policy making in the courts is that it is hard to define
and measure.2 Without a precise definition of what public confidence
means or how it can be measured, the regulation of judicial conduct has
traditionally focused on maintaining public confidence through enforcement
of specific rules that promote the three core values for judicial conduct:
independence, impartiality, and integrity.22

18. See ROBERTS, supra note 12; cf Charles Gardner Geyh, ParadiseLost, Paradigm
Found: Redefining the Judiciary'sImperiledRole in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1167
(1996) (commenting that various high-profile cases have caused concern that "post-Watergate
cynicism is finally catching up with the judiciary").
19. Arthur Selwyn Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and
Reflections, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 69, 69 (1970).
20. See, e.g., N.C. COMM'N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OF NORTH CAROLINA

65-80 (2017) (detailing recommendations of the Public Trust and Confidence Committee and
public polling on confidence in the courts); Hon. James L. Buckley, The Constitutionand the
Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 189-90 (2000) (citing
polls used by the ABA Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
and noting "significant deterioration in public support for the judiciary").
21. Miller, supra note 19, at 73 (noting that because our society is pluralistic, public
confidence in the judiciary has to be assessed according to which group is being discussed
and how much esteem its members hold for different types of courts at different times).
22. See Gregory C. Pingree, Where Lies the Emperor's Robe? An Inquiry into the
Problem ofJudicialLegitimacy, 86 OR. L. REv. 1095, 1107-08 (2007) (arguing that proper
judicial conduct, which the author terms "judicial legitimacy," is best understood through
specific examples of misconduct that make the notion concrete). See generally Dep't of Int'l
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Seventh U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime & the Treatment of
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary at 58, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf 121/22/Rev. 1 (Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985) (setting forth basic universal principles that
judiciaries should be independent and should act impartially and that members of the judiciary
must have integrity).
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JudicialIndependence

The concept of "judicial independence" has been central to our
constitutional structure since Alexander Hamilton forcefully wrote in
Federalist No. 78 that the "complete independence of the courts of justice is
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." 2 3 For society to be governed
by the rule of law, judges must be able to apply the law dispassionately, free
from any fear of retribution or a need to curry favor. Even in the state courts,
where judges are often elected and less insulated from the political process,
the independence of the judiciary continues to be a key feature in judicial
ethics regulation.24 Indeed, the preamble to the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct begins: "An independent and honorable judiciary is
indispensable to justice in our society, and to this end and in furtherance
thereof, this Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby established." 2 5 Judges must
be both actually independent-free to decide cases without fear of political
backlash-and perceived to be independent. As Justice Stephen Breyer
observed, justice is done when judges "are perceived by everyone around
them to be deciding according to law, rather than according to their own
whim or in compliance with the will of powerful political actors." 2 6 In other
words, justice must not only be done, "it must also be seen to be done." 27
2.

Integrity

In addition to acting independently, every judge must possess and be
perceived to possess the highest "integrity." Forjudges, "[a]bove all things,

23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Although judicial independence was
seen by Hamilton as necessary to protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed to all parties
under the Constitution, Hamilton also asserted that judicial independence was equally
important to ensuring vindication of the "private rights of particular classes of citizens." Id
In both public law and private law disputes, therefore, judicial independence is an essential
component of the rule of law.
24. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American Judicial
Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1007-14 (2002) (discussing the role ofjudicial
ethics rules in enforcing judicial independence, even where structural protections for judicial
institutions are not as strong as those embodied in the federal judiciary).
25. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015).
26. Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialIndependence in the UnitedStates, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
989, 996 (1996).
27. See Miller, supra note 19, at 79; see also R v. Sussex Justices, exparte McCarthy,
[1923] All ER 233 at 234 (relating to a question of conflicts between a clerk of the justices
and the attorneys for a defendant, Lord Chief Justice Hewart wrote: "[I]t is not merely of some
importance, but of fundamental importance, thatjustice should both be done and be manifestly
seen to be done.... [N]othing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has
been an improper interference with the course of justice.").
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integrity is their portion and proper virtue."2 8 Justice Kennedy put it simply
when he wrote that "j]udicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of
the highest order." 2 9
The problem with the concept of integrity, as with judicial
independence, is that it is difficult to reduce to a definition or measurable
qualification. Chief Justice John Roberts remarked in one opinion that "[t]he
concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to
precise definition, nor does it lend itself to proof by documentary record. But
no one denies that it is genuine and compelling." 30 Even as expressed in the
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, for example, the ethical rules are
broad and fail to give integrity a precise definition.3 While integrity can
have many meanings, in judicial ethics it is focused on ensuring that the
personal misconduct or dishonesty of one judge does not taint a particular
case or public opinion about the entire judiciary because "even one rotten
judicial apple can go far toward spoiling the entire judicial barrel." 3 2
3.

Impartiality

The third core value necessary to maintaining respect for the rule of law
is the concept of "impartiality." Although not quite as vague as the concepts
of independence and integrity, judicial impartiality is also susceptible to
varying interpretations.33 The late Justice Antonin Scalia identified three
aspects of impartiality in the important Supreme Court decision Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White.34 First, he suggested that the root meaning of
impartiality is simply "the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding."3 Bias in favor of or against a party implicates due process by
undermining the fairness of the proceeding.36 Judicial ethics rules attempt
to prevent bias against parties in court proceedings in various ways, such as

28. BACON, supranote 10, at 252.
29. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
30. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015).
31. See, e.g, N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015) (requiring
judges to personally observe appropriate standards of conduct to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary); id Canon 2 (requiring judges to avoid "impropriety").
32. Miller, supra note 19, at 70.
33. See Pingree, supra note 22, at 1122 (discussing difficulty defining impartiality and
neutrality in judicial decision making).
34. White, 536 U.S. at 775-84. The White decision is a landmark case in judicial ethics
law because it marked the first time that a judicial ethics restriction was struck down on First
Amendment grounds.
35. Id. at 775.
36. See id
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by prohibiting gifts from parties to the judge, ensuring that judges do not
have a financial interest in the outcome of a case, and requiring
disqualification where the judge is related to a party or lawyer in the case or
stands to benefit financially from the outcome of the case."
The second and third aspects of impartiality identified in White are
similar and function as two sides of the same coin. On the one side, Justice
Scalia writes that impartiality could be defined as "[a] judge's lack of
predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case."" He rejects that
definition, however, because "it is virtually impossible to find a judge who
does not have preconceptions about the law." 39 On the other side of the coin,
even where a judge has preconceptions about specific legal issues, Justice
Scalia writes that impartiality is reflected in the "openmindedness" or
willingness to at least "consider views that oppose [the judge's]
preconceptions."40 He notes that being open-minded toward legal arguments
presented by the parties, or at least appearing to be open-minded, is a
desirable quality in the judiciary.4 1
Concerns about open-mindedness are reflected in judicial ethics rules
that prohibit judges from making in-court statements or public comments
that exhibit predetermination as to who should win a case pending before the
judge; they also inhere in other rules that prohibit a judge's involvement in
extra-judicial activities that suggest favoritism to certain groups of
litigants.4 2 With these varying interpretations in mind, at a minimum
impartiality demands that judges not only refrain from hearing any cases in
which there is an actual conflict of interest but also that they regulate their
out-of-court comments and activities to ensure they are perceived to be open-

37. See, e.g., N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(4)(c) (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015)
(prohibiting gifts from parties); id Canon 5(C)(3) (requiring judges to manage "financial
interests to minimize the number of cases in which [the judge] is disqualified"); id Canon
3(C) (listing different bases for disqualification, such as prior service as a lawyer in the case,
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, relation to a party or lawyer in the case, and the like).
38. White, 536 U.S. at 777.
3 9. Id.
40. Id at 778.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(6) (N.C. Sup. CT. 2015) ("A
judge should abstain from public comment about the merits of a pending proceeding. . . .");
id Canon 4 ("A judge .. . may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so
the judge does not cast substantial doubt on the judge's capacity to decide impartially any
issue that may come before the judge. . . ."); see also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETCS § 4.07[2], at 4-21 (5th ed. 2015) ("[Jludicial comments or
remarks made out-of-court but in regard to court proceedings are not indicative of improper
bias unless they are so extreme that they show that a judge has become close-minded about a
pending case.").
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minded and willing to entertain a variety of legal arguments despite their
own preconceptions about the legal issues before them.
B.

PromotingPublic Confidence in the Courts Through Enforceable
Ethical Rules

If the three core values of independence, integrity, and impartiality are
essential to preserving public confidence in the judiciary, and consequently
the rule of law, and if these concepts themselves are vague and undefinable,
then how can they be applied in a meaningful way to regulate the conduct of
judges? This difficulty may explain why there were few concrete and
enforceable ethics rules governing the federal and state judiciaries prior to
the 1970s.43 Similarly, there were few mechanisms at the federal or state
level other than impeachment to discipline judges for misconduct." As
Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in White:
To comprehend, then to codify, the essence ofjudicial integrity is a hard task
That should not dissuade the profession. The difficulty of the
....
undertaking does not mean we should refrain from the attempt. Explicit
standards of judicial conduct provide essential guidance for judges in the
proper discharge of their duties and the honorable conduct of their office.
The legislative bodies, judicial committees, and professional associations
that promulgate those standards perform a vital public service.45

The focus on codifying the core values of independence, integrity, and
impartiality as enforceable judicial ethics rules began with the American Bar
Association's adoption of the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics, which served
as the primary set of ethical standards for judges.4 6 Like many ethics
reforms, including the reforms that followed Watergate, the ABA
promulgated the Canons to address a specific scandal: a federal judge had
served as Baseball Commissioner during the infamous Black Sox Scandal of
the 1919 World Series.47

43. See infra notes 46-47 regarding the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
44. GEYH ET AL., supra note 42, § 1.05, at 1-17 to -18 ("Until the middle of the twentieth
century, judicial misconduct in the United States was dealt with primarily through the
traditional procedures of impeachment, address, or recall."); see also id. § 1.04, at 1-10 to -11
(noting that members of Congress began to advocate for greater federal regulation ofjudicial
conduct in the wake of the Justice Fortas incident and other controversies at the Supreme
Court in the 1960s).
45. White, 536 U.S. at 793-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. Miller, supranote 19, at 71 (lamenting that the lack of defined ethical standards was
creating a problem in public confidence in the courts because the 1924 Canons were
aspirational and there were scant statutory rules governing judicial conduct).
47. See Jon P. McClanahan, Safeguardingthe Propriety ofthe Judiciary, 91 N.C. L. REv.
1951, 1961-62 (2013); Ronald D. Rotunda, JudcialEthics, the Appearance ofImpropriety,
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The problem with the Canons, however, was that they were nothing
more than the ABA's general guide for judicial conduct and only included a
blend of vague, hortatory goals coupled with a few specific restrictions. 48
Even with the development of the Canons, and although most states had
adopted them, 49 there was no formal code of conduct for federal judges, who
were instead governed by federal law, Supreme Court precedent, and
guidance from the Judicial Conference of the United States. 0 To compound
this problem, few states before the middle of the twentieth century had any
disciplinary mechanisms other than impeachment to hold judges accountable
for judicial misconduct." The federal courts had no formal process to accept
complaints about judicial misconduct until 1980.52
1.

The Development of the ABA's Model Code ofJudicialEthics

By the 1960s, the void in judicial ethics enforcement had become
apparent amidst the growing public distrust of government institutions. Even
before government ethics came into the spotlight when the Watergate
scandal broke in 1972,ss the United States was already facing significant
challenges in maintaining faith in democracy and the rule of law. The
Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement were causing mass
demonstrations and civil unrest, and the country was reeling from the
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Jr., Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and Bobby Kennedy. At the same time, the Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren continued to draw stringent criticism

and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1337, 1351 (2006)
(discussing the role of federal judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as Commissioner of Baseball
at the time of the World Series scandal in motivating adoption of the 1924 Canons).
48. GEYHET AL., supra note 42, § 1.03, at 1-5.; see also Rotunda, supranote 47, at 135152 (citing John F. Sutton, Jr., A Comparison of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility with
the Code ofJudicialConduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 355, 355-56).
49. GEYHET AL., supra note 42, § 1.04, at 1-10.
50. See, e.g, Joshua Kastenberg, Chief Justice William Howard Taft's Conception of
JudicialIntegrity: The LegalHistory of Tumey v. Ohio, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 317,324 (2017)
(citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79, which prohibited judges from
serving in cases where they had a financial interest in the case).
51. See GEYHET AL., supra note 42, § 1.05, at 1-17 to -18 (noting that prior to the 1960s,
few states had procedures in place other than impeachment, address, and recall to deal with
judicial misconduct).
52. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.
53. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 10, 1972, at Al.
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from conservatives objecting to decisions on social issues such as the rights
of criminal defendants and desegregation.5 4
In the midst of this upheaval and intense focus on the Supreme Court,
a high-profile judicial scandal involving Justice Abe Fortas, coupled with
contemporaneous problems with other federal judges," sharpened the focus
of politicians on how best to discipline judges (especially those appointed by
presidents of the opposite party).56 Justice Fortas's close relationship to
President Lyndon Johnson brought into the spotlight the lack of any ethical
rules to protect the perception of judicial independence. Ever since Chief
Justice John Jay declined to provide legal advice to President George
Washington," justices and judges have been expected to maintain at least
the appearance of functional separation from the executive branch.
Nevertheless, as one author noted, prior to the scrutiny of Justice Fortas's
relationship with President Johnson, "the principle that members of the
Supreme Court should refrain from partisanship was unsettled at best."58

54. See Miller, supra note 19, at 90 ("[T]he majority of the Justices of the Warren Court
have been accused of such 'derelictions' as 'coddling criminals' and 'protective
subversives-in other words, of applying some dual standard ofjustice.").
55. Id at 78-81 (discussing various incidents involving Supreme Court Justices and other
federal judges who caused ethics concerns prior to the Justice Fortas scandal, including issues
with investments (Judge Clement Haynsworth), problems with Justices serving as advisors to
presidents (in addition to Justice Fortas, Justices Frankfurter, Vinson, and Brandeis served in
such capacity), problems associated with outside executive service (Justice Roberts serving
on the Pearl Harbor Commission, Chief Justice Warren leading the investigation of the
Kennedy assassination, and Justice Jackson's involvement in the Nuremberg trials), and
public speeches on controversial matters (Judge Friendly and Judge Skelly Wright)).
56. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a PartisanPolitical
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 260 (2007). According to Neumann, 1968 also
marked the beginning of "an era in which impeachment [ofjudges andjustices] could be used
as a partisan political weapon in a long and not-yet-ended struggle" for control of the Supreme
Court. Id; see also id at 269-72 (describing the efforts to impeach Justice William 0.
Douglas in 1970).
57. See Letter from Supreme Court Justices to George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 13
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 392-93 (Christine Sternberg Patrick ed., 2007) ("The
Lines of Separation drawn by the Constitution between the three Departments of
Government-their being in certain Respects checks on each other-and our being Judges of
a court in the last Resort-are Considerations which afford strong arguments against the
Propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as the Power
given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions,
seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive Departments.").
58. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Legacy of Chief Justice Fortas, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 261,
261 (2015); see also id at 268-69 n.39 (noting that in the wake of the Justice Fortas scandal
and the focus on ethical rules to promote the appearance of judicial independence, the
Supreme Court adapted its practices and protocols to address the public perception of
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Several Supreme Court Justices had served as advisors to presidents or on
federal commissions, and Justice Robert Jackson famously left the Supreme
Court temporarily to serve as the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. 9
In the politically charged, hyper-partisan 1960s, however, Justice Fortas's
relationship with President Johnson was more problematic. Among other
things, Justice Fortas participated in policy meetings in President Johnson's
war cabinet during the Vietnam War and advised him on other important
policy decisions.6 0
Political concerns about Justice Fortas's relationship to President
Johnson came to a head after Chief Justice Earl Warren announced his
retirement in early 1968 in an effort to have President Johnson name his
replacement before the 1968 presidential election. President Johnson
nominated Justice Fortas for Chief Justice, which created a political
showdown in the Senate and ultimately led to a filibuster. 6 1 In addition to
political opposition to Justice Fortas based on his relationship with President
Johnson, it was discovered during the confirmation process that Justice
Fortas was receiving a large teaching stipend (equal to 40% of his judicial
salary) to teach a summer course at a Washington, D.C. law school. 62 With
these issues swirling around Justice Fortas's nomination, it became clear that
he would not receive enough support in the Senate for confirmation, and his
nomination was eventually withdrawn.63
After the debacle of Justice Fortas's failed nomination in 1968, and with
his name already in the political crosshairs, another scandal broke in May
1969 when Life magazine published an article entitled "Fortas of the
Supreme Court: A Question of Ethics" with the subtitle "The Justice .. . and
the Stock Manipulator."6 4 Aided by Justice Fortas's political enemies in the
Nixon Administration, the article contained an expos6 on Justice Fortas's
relationship with financier Louis Wolfson, who had been convicted of
securities fraud and was being represented by Justice Fortas's former law

separation of powers, such as by refraining from clapping during the President's State of the
Union Address).
59. See Miller, supra note 19, at 78 (noting that Justices Frankfurter, Vinson, and
Brandeis had served in advisory roles and had close relationships with presidents and that
other Justices faced problems associated with outside executive service).
60. See, e.g, Magliocca, supra note 58, at 266.
61. See Neumann, supra note 56, at 261-62 (describing confirmation process and
filibuster in the Justice Fortas nomination).
62. See Filibuster Derails Supreme Court Appointment, U.S.
SENATE,
https://perma.cc/6TEZ-MQ5A.
63. See id
64. See William Lambert, Fortasofthe Supreme Court: A Question ofEthics, LIFE, May
5, 1969, at 32, 32-33.
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firm." Curiosity regarding Justice Fortas's connection to Wolfson was
heightened after the Supreme Court issued an order on April 1, 1969 denying
review in Wolfson's case and noting that Justice Fortas had recused himself
and not participated in the decision.66 The Life article uncovered the fact that
Wolfson's family foundation had paid Justice Fortas $20,000 while he was
serving as an Associate Justice, allegedly in return for the advice Justice
Fortas was providing relating to various charitable, educational, and civil
67
rights projects. Wolfson also had allegedly invoked his friendship with
Justice Fortas as part of his defense strategy and to gain support for a
presidential pardon from President Johnson. 8 It was also reported that
Justice Fortas had personally visited with Wolfson to discuss the federal
securities investigation in the early stages of the allegations.6 9 Justice Fortas
resigned from the Supreme Court shortly after the Life article was
published."
Although Justice Fortas's conduct was not the only event that served as
the impetus for much-needed change in judicial ethics enforcement,n the

65. Id at 33-34; see also Neumann, supra note 56, at 262-66 (describing involvement
of the Department of Justice and the Nixon Administration in research for the Life article to
find grounds to impeach Justice Fortas).
66. Lambert, supra note 64, at 33.
67. Id See also Neumann, supra note 56, at 264-65 (describing Justice Fortas's
acceptance of the consulting fee from the Wolfson Foundation).
68. Lambert, supra note 64, at 33. (Life commented that while Wolfson's name-dropping
"was done without [Justice Fortas's] knowledge," it did "not change the fact that his
acceptance of the money, and other actions, made the name-dropping effective.").
69. In a January 23, 1977 article for the Washington Post, famed journalist Bob
Woodward (who broke the Watergate scandal with Carl Bernstein), reported that Wolfson
had secretly recorded a conversation with Justice Fortas after Justice Fortas resigned and just
after Wolfson was released from prison in 1970. See Bob Woodward, FortasTie to Wolfson
Is Detailed, WASH. PoST, Jan. 23, 1977 (detailing revelations in a secretly recorded
conversation between Wolfson and Justice Fortas, including reference to a letter that Wolfson
wrote to Justice Fortas seeking help in obtaining a presidential pardon from President
Johnson). According to the transcript of that conversation, during his tenure on the Supreme
Court, Justice Fortas was "heavily involved in advising Wolfson on legal difficulties he had
with the Securities and Exchange Commission." Id "[A]t one point, Fortas agreed to
intervene directly with the SEC chairman on the case." Id Woodward's article also revealed
that Justice Fortas had convinced Wolfson not to release letters they had exchanged, including
one in which Wolfson sought Justice Fortas's help to get a pardon from President Johnson.
Id.
70. See Neumann, supra note 56, at 262-63.
71. See Miller, supra note 19, at 78-81. See also Kastenberg, supra note 50, at 330-31
(describing how Chief Justice Taft, who chaired the ABA committee that drafted the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, faced criticism for an annuity he was granted under the will of Andrew
Carnegie and continued to receive after becoming Chief Justice); Neumann, supranote 56, at

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

546

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

scandal and hyper-partisanship in 1968 and 1969 proved pivotal in the
development of enforceable judicial ethics rules in the United States. It
became apparent that the Canons of Judicial Ethics did not adequately
address the problem of judicial misconduct, especially when it related to a
judge's extra-judicial activities and outside income.7 2 The intense political
scrutiny and renewed focus on impeachment also caused the ABA and
judicial reformers across the country to consider alternative mechanisms to
address judicial misconduct to avoid politicized impeachment processes.73
Consequently, like the post-Watergate ethics revolution in the federal
government, a small but significant revolution in judicial ethics occurred in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The ABA's efforts culminated on August 16, 1972, when it replaced
the Canons with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which emphasized the
hope that "all jurisdictions [would] adopt this Code and establish effective
disciplinary procedures for its enforcement." 7 4 In the context of the
unprecedented fall of public confidence in government institutions in the
1960s, the 1972 Model Code also openly embraced the idea that maintaining
public confidence in the courts depended not only on avoiding actual
misconduct but also on avoiding even the appearance of impropriety on and
off the bench:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety. He must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.
He must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.75

269-70 (describing an annuity and compensation received by Justice William 0 Douglas for
work on a non-profit foundation).
72. See Miller, supra note 19, at 72 (noting that the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the governing council of the federal judiciary, issued guidelines in 1969 to limit outside
activities of federal judges, although the guidance was rescinded after Chief Justice Warren
left office and attention on the Justice Fortas scandal waned).
73.

See ARTHUR H. GARWIN ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT 4

(3d ed. 2016) ("The intent of the Code is to preserve, and not to undermine, judicial
independence.... The Code helps maintain judicial independence through its guarantee that
judges will generally not be disciplined for mere errors of law in their decisions." (internal
citations omitted)); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountabilityfrom
the Realm of PoliticalRhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 911, 916 (2006) (defining judicial
accountability as ensuring proper enforcement of rules of conduct rather than political
accountability for unpopular decisions).
74. E. WAYNE THODE, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT

5 (1973).

75. Id. at 8.
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With its focus on the appearance of impropriety, the 1972 Model Code thus
created a far-reaching basis for finding misconduct by judges.76 By 1990,
forty-seven states had adopted a code of judicial conduct based in whole or
in part on the 1972 Model Code." The ABA Model Code was revised in
1990 and 2007, and the ABA continues to consider and adopt new rules or
comments to guide its application.
2.

The Problem of Enforcement

Beyond adopting specific ethical guidelines for judges in the ABA
Model Code, the more difficult question-and one of the main failings of the
Canons-was the lack of an appropriate enforcement mechanism. The
question of how to hold judges accountable for misconduct while preventing
undue interference with the courts has vexed the country since its founding.
Alexander Hamilton recognized in Federalist No. 78 that "[t]he benefits of
the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more
States than one; and .... Considerate men, of every description, ought to
prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts."79 Even
so, concerns about protecting judicial independence led to a system that
allowed for judicial discipline only through impeachment.8 0 As Hamilton
remarked in Federalist No. 79, impeachment for misconduct was "the only
provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary independence
of the judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own
constitution [sic] in respect to our own judges."8 1 The Founding Fathers
specifically rejected removal ofjudges for incompetence out of concern that

76. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Av. BAR Ass'N 1972).

This

significant change in conceptualizing misconduct was not universally adopted in all states,
with some-such as North Carolina-later removing such language. See McClanahan, supra
note 47, at 1959-60 (discussing the removal of the standard from the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct). Finding ethical violations to arise from a mere appearance of improper
conduct, even where none occurred, has also been the subject of criticism as a basis for judicial
discipline because of its vagueness. See, e.g., Hon. Raymond J. McKoski, JudicialDiscipline
and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN.
L. REv. 1914, 1936-50 (2010) (examining whether this standard is too vague to be applied in
accord with due process); Pingree, supra note 22, at 1126-27 (discussing the problem of
making an "appearance of impropriety" standard concrete and enforceable); Rotunda, supra
note 47, at 1343-44; see also George D. Brown, The Ethics Backlash and the Independent
Counsel Statute, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 433, 466-67 (1999) (describing the criticism of the
"ethics establishment" pursuing vague assertions of improper conduct).
77. See GEYHET AL., supranote 42, § 1.03, at 1-6.
78. See GARWIN ET AL., supra note 73, at xi-xiii.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
80. GEYHET AL, supra note 42, § 1.05, at 1-19.
81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
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such a provision "would be more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer
any good purpose."8 2
In the wake of the Justice Fortas scandal and the resurgence of
politically motivated impeachment efforts," and with impeachment of state
court judges rare, slow, and political,8 4 the ABA and judicial reformers began
to focus on alternatives to impeachment to enforce judicial ethics rules. Prior
to 1972, a few states had experimented with alternatives to impeachment,
such as special courts that could remove judges or other ad hoc procedures
for judicial discipline. In 1960, California established the first permanent
independent judicial conduct commission to investigate complaints of
judicial misconduct and to impose sanctions on judges short of removal from
office. After the promulgation of the 1972 Model Code and its call to the
states to adopt appropriate enforcement mechanisms, 87 the judicial conduct
commission model gained traction and was adopted in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia shortly after the close of the 1970s. 8 8

3.

JudicialEthics andEnforcement in North Carolina

Like many states prior to the Justice Fortas scandal and the Watergate
era, North Carolina had no formal code of conduct for judges, and the "slow
and cumbersome" process of impeachment was the only way to remove or
discipline a judge of the General Court of Justice.89 In the context of the
nationwide attention to judicial ethics issues, in 1969 the North Carolina
General Assembly reconstituted the North Carolina Courts Commission to
consider reforms in the courts relating to judicial discipline and removal. 90
In its 1971 final report, the Courts Commission recommended that North
Carolina adopt the independent judicial conduct commission model started

82. Id. Hamilton further explained that any ground short of insanity, mental infirmity, or
lack of ability would not generally be sufficient for removal of federal judges from office. Id
83. See Neumann, supra note 56, at 260-72.
84. The North Carolina Courts Commission noted that no North Carolinajudge had been
removed by impeachment since 1868. See STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA COURTS COMMISSION TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 19

(1971) [hereinafter COURTS COMMISSION REPORT]; see also JoHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN
NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION

139-40 (2d ed. 2013).

85. See GEYHET AL., supranote 42, § 1.05, at 1-18.
86. Id.
87. See THODE, supra note 74.
88. See GEYHET AL., supra note 42, § 1.05, at 1-18.
89. ORTH &NEWBY, supra note 84. District court judges, whose positions were created
in 1967, could not be impeached and could be removed from office only for misconduct or
mental or physical incapacity. COURTS COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 84.
90. COURTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 2.
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in California.9 1 In recommending the creation of a judicial conduct
commission, the Courts Commission considered carefully the topic of
judicial discipline, noting that it is "a very sensitive one" given concerns
The Courts Commission
about protecting judicial independence.92
ultimately recommended the judicial conduct commission model because it
allows all three branches of government and the State Bar to appoint
members to an independent commission to consider complaints and
recommend discipline but allows "the judiciary to police its own ranks, with
any decision to censure, remove or retire coming from the supreme court." 93
In response to the Courts Commission Report, the General Assembly
began the process of implementing its recommendations, which required a
constitutional amendment to authorize the legislature to create a statutory
alternative to impeachment for judicial misconduct.94 In tandem with that
amendment, the General Assembly passed the Judicial Standards
Commission Act, which created an independent judicial conduct
commission effective January 1, 1973." Shortly thereafter, the North

91. See id at 27-30.
92. Id at 20; see also N.C. State Bar v. Tillett, 794 S.E.2d 743, 752 (N.C. 2016) (Martin,
C.J., concurring) (noting that the Judicial Standards Commission was created to "balance the
need for judicial independence with the need forjudicial accountability").
93. CouRTs CO1@HSSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 26.

94. Act of June 14, 1971, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 488 (amending article IV, section 17 of
the North Carolina Constitution upon approval by a majority of voters in the 1972 general
election); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2); see In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d 890, 921 (N.C. 1978)
("Both [the Judicial Standards Commission Act] and the constitutional amendment
authorizing this legislation were conceived and ratified together. Both bills were enacted by
the General Assembly within three days of-each other in June 1971. The statute by its terms
was to become effective on January 1, 1973 provided the voters of the State approved."
(internal citations omitted)); see also In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (N.C. 1978) ("The
Judicial Standards Commission Act, which defines the role of this Court in the censure and
removal of judges, was enacted on 17 June 1971, nearly seventeen months prior to the
ratification of the amendment to Article IV which authorizes removal ofjudges other than by
impeachment. The effective date of the Act, however, was made contingent upon the
ratification of the amendment.").
95. Judicial Standards Commission Act, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 517. As amended, article
IV, section 17(2) of the North Carolina Constitution now provides that
[t]he General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in addition to impeachment and
address set forth in this Section, for the removal of a Justice or Judge of the General
Court of Justice for mental or physical incapacity interfering with the performance
of his duties which is, or is likely to become, permanent, and for the censure and
removal of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful misconduct
in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice that brings the judicial office into disrepute."
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2).
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Carolina Supreme Court adopted the state's first official Code of Judicial
Conduct on September 26, 1973.
The North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, like that of many states, is based very closely on the 1972 ABA
Model Code with some minor deviations and as amended from time to time.
As in the states, the federal courts moved quickly in the 1970s to adopt
the substantive standards for judicial ethics suggested by the 1972 ABA
Model Code. The Judicial Conference of the United States 9 7 adopted the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges on April 5, 1973, although to this
day Justices of the United States Supreme Court are not bound by the Code
and are subject only to federal law and internal policies with respect to
substantive ethics rules.98 To enforce the new federal code of judicial
conduct, Congress did not follow the independent conduct commission
model. Instead, Congress enacted the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980,99 which allows the federal judiciary to be entirely self-policing. 100
From time to time, and often under the threat of congressional action to
intervene more aggressively into the arena of judicial accountability, the
federal courts have evaluated and strengthened the process for reviewing
complaints of federal judicial misconduct.0 1

96. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (N.C. SUP. CT. 1973); see In re Nowell, 237 S.E.2d
246, 252 (N.C. 1977) ("Specific guidelines for judicial officers of North Carolina are to be
found in the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by this Court on 26 September
1973 and published in 283 N.C. 771.... The General Assembly intended the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct to be a guide to the meaning of the [Judicial Standards Commission
Act].").
97. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012); see also Governance & the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/QZM8-TDW6.
98. Congress has, however, from time to time considered bills applying the Code to
Supreme Court Justices. See Scott Bomboy, Why the Supreme Court Isn't Compelled to
Follow a Conduct Code, NAT'L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (July 15, 2016),
https://perma.cc/N7ZD-SUPM.
99. See Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2012). See generally
Judicial Conduct & Disability, U.S. CTs., https://perma.cc/LDW9-86GG (describing the
process for filing a complaint against a federal judge for misconduct or disability).
100. Cf, e.g., COURTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 84, at 25-26.
101. See, e.g., HON. STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT & DISABILITY ACT
STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980, at

5 (2006) (summarizing conclusions on a study of whether federal courts were effectively
evaluating complaints of misconduct under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act,
especially "high-visibility cases-hose . . . that have come to the attention of (or have been
filed by) members of Congress."); see also ROBERTS, supra note 12 (addressing sexual
harassment in the judiciary and establishing a working group to consider the issue).
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BEYOND WATERGATE: PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS IN THE
DIGITAL AGE

With the rules and framework for judicial accountability in place after
the 1970s ethics revolution, courts and judicial policy makers have continued
to struggle with how to effectively maintain and promote public confidence
in the courts in changing times. In the twenty-first century, one of the biggest
policy challenges for courts across the country has been the proliferation of
technology. The advent of the Internet has presented countless benefits for
the administration of justice. Such benefits include electronic filing,
electronic case management, improved public outreach, and increased
accessibility through online forms and resources for litigants and lawyers.
At the same time, the efficiency of communicating through electronic means,
the ease of sharing information instantly through social media, and the
accessibility of vast amounts of information on virtually every topic have
created new landmines that could explode into controversies that weaken
public confidence in the courts.
Threats to public confidence in the administration of justice in the
digital world differ from the embarrassment and national security concerns
that arise from cybersecurity breaches in other government institutions. And,
while cybersecurity in the courts is an important concern, 10 2 danger to public
confidence in the administration of justice is perhaps more serious and far
more likely to arise from the conduct ofjudges as they interact in the digital
world. Judges are not immune from the general human desire to share
personal news and opinions with others on social media or to satisfy curiosity
through quick resort to Internet research. Moreover, in states that elect their
judges, the use of social media and the Internet is a necessity to reach donors
and voters.
In this context, two of the most difficult and controversial issues for
judicial ethics regulation in the twenty-first century are (1) how to regulate a
judge's use of social media (for professional, political, and personal reasons)
and (2) how to monitor a judge's natural curiosity (or even prurient
interests) 0 3 through quick searches on the Internet. As set forth below,
102. See Information Systems and Cybersecurity--Annual Report 2016, U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/LF9N-QP45 (describing efforts in the federal courts to address cybersecurity
risks); see also Brian McLaughlin, Cybersecurity: ProtectingCourt Data, PA TIMES (May
26, 2017), https://perma.cc/6VMF-KKLC (describing cyberattacks in both the Minnesota and
federal courts).
103. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, ProminentAppeals CourtJudge Alex Kozinski Accused of
Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://perma.ce/J4UE-SFQL (describing an
incident where Judge Kozinski asked a female law clerk to come into his office "and pulled
up pornography on his computer, asking if she thought it was photoshopped or if it aroused
her sexually").
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unlike ethical pitfalls of the past, these two new frontiers pose complex
problems because both offer benefits to the judge and the administration of
justice while at the same time exposing judges to criticism that could increase
distrust of the judiciary.
A.

TestingJudicialRestraint: Limits on the Use of SocialMedia

Digital communication has not only taken the lives of private citizens
by storm-elected officials, too, have increasingly found the use of email
and social media beneficial for reaching supporters and informing the public
about policies or other events occurring in their institutions. But, as
communication today takes place more often electronically rather than
through phone calls or private conversations, it is easy to imagine the myriad
forms of "smoking gun" evidence that could bring down a political career.
A new 'political scandal is just a screenshot away from every Facebook
post,104 email, 1 05 or text.1 0 6 In social media in particular, the countless ways
in which statements and even emotions can be made visible to others has
created a number of potential ethics and personnel problems in the public
sector. For example, in Bland v. Roberts, the Fourth Circuit held that the
thumbs up emoji indicating that a Facebook user "likes" a political campaign
is symbolic expression and political speech protected by the First
In Bland, an elected sheriff thus faced potential
Amendment.'"
constitutional liability for taking negative employment action against a
department employee who liked his opponent's campaign page.'0 8
Likewise, judicial disciplinary agencies and judicial ethics advisory
committees have increasingly been confronted with potential threats to
public confidence in the courts arising from the social media conduct of
judges. The range of misconduct occurring on social media includes ex parte

104. See, e.g, Lindsey Bever & Marwa Eltagouri, Ohio Governor CandidateApologizes
for Boasting ofSexual History with Approximately 50 Very Attractive Females, WASH. POST
(Nov. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/3W7Q-B3XY, (discussing the Facebook post of Ohio
Supreme Court Chief Justice and gubernatorial candidate William O'Neill relating to his past
sexual history).
105. See, e.g., Jo Becker, Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, Emails Disclose Trump Son's
Glee at Russian Offer, N.Y. TIMEs, July 12, 2017, at Al (discussing release of Donald Trump,
Jr.'s emails with a Russian lawyer during his father's 2016 presidential campaign).
106. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Texts Live On, but That's Often Forgotten in Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2016, at A20 (detailing cases where political scandals emerged after text
messages were revealed).
107. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386-88 (4th Cir. 2013).
108. Id.
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communications with parties or witnesses,109 inappropriate sexual
conduct,"o racially charged statements,"' inappropriate campaign or
political conduct, 112 or various other kinds of improper or undignified
behavior." Each of these situations implicates the three core values in
judicial ethics-impartiality, independence, and integrity. To address these
problems, some states have adopted strict limits on the social media activity
of judges, while others have been more flexible and have adapted existing
ethical rules to evaluate conduct on the Internet.114 The ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility and a number of state judicial ethics advisory
bodies have also issued ethics advisory opinions applying the existing
judicial ethics canons to internet use by judges."'s In North Carolina, the
Judicial Standards Commission has not issued a formal advisory opinion on

&

109. See, e.g., Public Reprimand of Hon. B. Carlton Terry, Jr., Inquiry No. 08-234 (N.C.
Judicial Standards Comm'n April 1, 2009) (sanctioning judge for communicating on
Facebook with an attorney appearing before him about the case).
110. See, e.g, Archer, Case No. 47 (Ala. Court of the Judiciary Aug. 8, 2016) (disciplining
judge for Facebook contact with litigant that led to sexual relationship).
111. See, e.g, Amended Public Reprimand and Order of Additional Education of Hon.
James Oakley, CJC No. 17-0320-CO (Tex. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct May 8, 2017)
(disciplining judge for posting racially insensitive comments on Facebook regarding a murder
suspect).
112. See, e.g, In re Callaghan, 796 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 2016) (disciplining judge for
posting misleading flyers on his personal and campaign Facebook page).
113. Cf In re Slaughter, 480 S.W.3d 842 (Special Court of Review of Tex. 2015) (finding
that judge did not violate state ethics rules when commenting on an ongoing criminal trial
before her, despite recommendation of state judicial conduct commission).
114. See Hon. Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking and JudicialEthics, 2 ST. MARY'S J.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHIcs 2, 6 (2012) (referring to these frameworks as the restrictive
approach and the integrative approach); see also id at 17-21 (citing Florida, Massachusetts,
and Oklahoma as states with tight restrictions on social media use for judges but also noting
that Florida has eased some of its initial restrictions); Samuel Vincent Jones, Judges, Friends,
and Facebook: The Ethics of Prohibition, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 288-93 (2011)
(describing same and discussing ethics opinions from various states on the issue). But see
John G. Browning, Why Can't We Be Friends?Judges' Use ofSocial Media, 68 U. MIAIvN L.
REv. 487, 489-90 (2014) (suggesting an alternative approach to the integrative or restrictive
approach that would account for the practical realities thatjudges can and do interact through
a number of modes of social discourse).
115. See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013)
(discussing judges' use of electronic social networking media); ABA Comm'n on Ethics
Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 478 (2017) (discussing independent factual research by
judges via the Internet). For a list of advisory opinions and disciplinary orders relating to
social media use by judges, see Cynthia Gray, Social Media and JudicialEthics: Part1, 39
JuD. CONDUCT REP. 2 (2017), CYNTHIA GRAY, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SOCIAL MEDIA
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (2017), and MICHAEL CROWELL, UNC SCHOOL OF Gov'T, JUDICIAL
ETmCS AND SOCIAL MEDIA (2015).
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the issue ofjudges' social media use. 1 6 As such, North Carolina judges must
be guided by the more general rules that are intended to promote impartiality,
independence, and integrity in the judiciary.1 17
One of the most problematic aspects of ajudge's use of social media is
how to evaluate social media connections and content in deciding whether
the judge's digital relationship to someone requires recusal when that person
appears before the judge. Under both the ABA Model Code and the North
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should not preside over a case if
the circumstances suggest that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. 18 This inquiry is generally focused on whether the judge has a
relationship to the parties and lawyers appearing in the case. 19 With the
advent of social media, the potential universe of personal relationships (or
connections) has exponentially increased the risk of conflicts and
appearances of bias that have challenged public confidence in the judiciary
in new and profound ways. This is particularly true in states where judges
are elected. Campaigns use social media to connect with as many people as
possible in the community, including lawyers. Because the "root meaning"
of impartiality is focused on whether the judge may favor a party or lawyer
in the case because of a personal relationship, 120 and because it is often easy
to ascertain who is digitally connected to a judge on social media, public
116. Although not an interpretation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, the
North Carolina State Bar has issued a formal ethics opinion under the Rules of Professional
Responsibility that a lawyer may accept a LinkedIn invitation from a judge, reasoning that
social and professional interactions between lawyers and judges online should be evaluated
in the same way as other personal interactions with a judge. See N.C. State Bar, 2014 Formal

Ethics Op. 8 (2015).
117. There are very real concerns about public confidence in the courts every time a judge
decides to use Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, or some other social media platform. In all of
these contexts, the most applicable provisions of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct
(which is based on the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with some exceptions) are as
follows: Canons I and 2(A) (requiring judges to personally uphold public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality ofthe judiciary); Canon 2(B) (prohibiting conveying
the impression that another person is in a special position to influence the judge); Canon
3(A)(4) (prohibiting ex parte communications with parties and lawyers); Canon 3(A)(6)
(restricting the freedom of judges to make public comments about the merits of a pending
proceeding); Canon 3(C) (providing for disqualification based on connections to the parties,
lawyers, and witnesses or where the judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned); and
Canons 4 and 5 (regulating extra-judicial conduct, such as active assistance in fundraising for
charitable organizations). See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015).
118. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007) (relating to
disqualification); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015)
(identifying rules for disqualification).
119. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007); N.C. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (N.C. SUP. CT. 2015).

120. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-76 (2002).
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confidence in the impartiality ofjudges is potentially undermined every time
that "friend" or "connection" appears before the judge. Indeed, it is not
uncommon for judicial conduct commissions to receive complaints from
litigants who learn (usually after losing their case) that the judge is social
media friends with opposing counsel.
Courts across the United States are split on whether disqualification is
required based on a social media connection, at least where there are no other
indicia of a close personal relationship or communications about the case
that would otherwise require recusal. The outcome in these cases often turns
on whether state ethics opinions allow judges and lawyers to be connected
on social media at all.
For example, in a Florida case, where state judicial ethics opinions
prohibit social media connections between judges and lawyers, a trial judge's
decision not to disqualify was reversed by the appeals court because the
judge was Facebook friends with the prosecuting attorney. 12 1 Conversely, in
a Tennessee case, where state judicial ethics opinions have not prohibited
such connections, an appellate court upheld the decision of the trial judge not
to recuse in a criminal case where the judge was Facebook friends with a
confidential informant witness. 2 2 Similarly, in a Texas case, the appellate
court upheld the decision of a trial judge not to recuse in a case where he was
Facebook friends with the father of the victim, even though the father sent
unsolicited private messages on Facebook to the trial judge regarding
The court reasoned that the social media
leniency in the matter. 123
connection was tenuous and existed in relation to the social media sites for
the judge's and the other party's political campaigns; further, the judge had
taken immediate steps to advise the father not to communicate with him on
Facebook about the case and notified the parties of the content of the
communication. 124 On the other hand, in North Carolina, where social media
connections between lawyers and judges are not per se prohibited, a district
court judge was still disciplined for communicating with an attorney via
Facebook about the case while the attorney was appearing before him. 12 5
Beyond disqualification based on social media connections, a bigger
threat to public confidence in the courts comes from inappropriate social
media content posted by judges. More so than mere connections on social
media, the content of a judge's post can potentially implicate a judge's
121. Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
122. State v. Forguson, No. M2013-00257-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
134, at *35--36 (Feb. 18, 2014).
123. Youkers v. State, 400 S.W.3d 200, 204-05 (Tex. App. 2013).
124. Id at 206-07.
125. See Public Reprimand of Hon. B. Carlton Terry, Jr., Inquiry No. 08-234, at 3-4 (N.C.
Judicial Standards Comm'n April 1, 2009).
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independence, integrity, and impartiality. As such, in this area in particular,
treatment of judges is markedly different from other public officials not
subject to strict conduct rules or regulations.
The content of posts or likes, and even inappropriate comments by
followers on ajudge's social media page, raise concerns that members of the
public will see the judge as being biased, lacking integrity, or otherwise
being apt to make decisions based on politics and personal opinions rather
than the facts and law.1 26 Judges who have ventured onto their social media
pages to comment on controversial issues, or who comment on their own
cases, are especially at risk of disciplinary action. For example, in a
noteworthy case in Texas, the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct
publicly reprimanded Burnet County Judge James Oakley for making an
inappropriate comment on his personal Facebook page suggesting that it was
time for "a tree and a rope" for an African American man accused of killing
a San Antonio police officer. 127 At the time the public reprimand was issued,
the Commission had received 18 separate written complaints about the
Facebook post. 12 8 In addition to racially charged content, judges have also
been disciplined for sexually inappropriate behavior through social media.
Alabama Probate Judge Leon Archer was suspended without pay for 180
days after he sought out a young woman on Facebook who had been a litigant
in his court and later exchanged sexually explicit private messages with
her. 129
Personal feuds that play out on social media can also lead to judicial
discipline. In yet another Facebook controversy involving ajudge, Kentucky
Judge Olu Stevens was suspended for ninety days without pay after the
judge, in a series of Facebook posts, accused the local prosecutor of racism
in jury selection, commented on his reasoning for the sentencing in the case,
accused the victims in the case of instilling a fear of black men in their fiveyear-old child, and criticized the local defense bar for not supporting him in
challenging the jury practices of the prosecutor's office.1 30
In an age of "tweet storms" and hyper-partisan feuds among politicians,
these cases highlight the stark differences in the treatment of judges
126. See Jones, supra note 114, at 296-302 (discussing Code of Judicial Conduct
provisions promoting impartiality, independence, and the threat of "friending" and posting
comments on social media).
127. Amended Public Reprimand and Order of Additional Education of Hon. James
Oakley, CJC No. 17-0320-CO, at 2 (Tex. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct May 8, 2017).
128. Id.
129. See Archer, Case No. 47, at 2, 6 (Ala. Court of the Judiciary Aug. 8, 2016).
130. Stevens (Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n Aug. 8, 2016). See Jason Riley, State
Officials Suspend Louisville Judge Olu Stevens for 90 Days Without Pay, WDRB (Aug. 8,
2016, 5:35 PM), https://perma.cc/5BNU-UA75.
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compared to other public officials when it comes to outrageous social media
conduct. They also demonstrate how dramatically standards and practices in
judicial ethics enforcement have changed since the judicial reforms
following the Justice Fortas scandal. It is difficult to imagine public
confidence in the judiciary in the social media age with only the aspirational
goals of the Canons in place and no formal mechanisms to address judicial
misconduct other than impeachment.
It is also critical to continue to address the concerns of citizens
regarding social media use by judges, especially where it reinforces existing
problems in the public's perception about the unfairness and politicization
of the courts. For example, a recent poll in North Carolina regarding public
confidence in the courts showed that many respondents perceived that
wealthy, white citizens with lawyers receive better treatment in the courts
than low-income litigants, pro se parties, or non-white or non-English
speaking people.1 3 ' The election of judges on partisan ballots and the
ensuing need to raise campaign funds and publicly declare party loyalty has
also consistently undermined public confidence in the independence of
courts. 13 2 Social media conduct that raises concerns about partisanship,
racism, or favoritism toward lawyers (especially those who are perceived as
social friends) compounds the perception that judges do not decide cases
fairly and that political affiliation or outside relationships rather than facts
and law determine outcomes in cases. Once again, perception is reality in
the realm ofjudicial ethics.
B.

Independent Internet Research and the Fake News Conundrum

If the temptation for judges to use social media is not enough, the vast
amount of information now available on the Internet has proved to be both a
blessing and potential curse for judges. In the field of judicial ethics, a
concern that has been drawing significant attention in the ABA and academia
131. N.C. ColvmI'N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 20, at app. B 35; see
also ELON

UNIv.

POLL,

STATE

COURTS

OCTOBER

29-NOVEMBER

2,

2015,

at 4,

https://perma.ccIT7G5-PE4Z (finding that 76.2% of respondents believed people without a
lawyer are treated somewhat or far worse than represented litigants, 46.2% of respondents
believed that African American litigants are treated somewhat or far worse than other litigants,
and 63.8% believed that low-income people are treated somewhat or far worse than other
litigants).
132.

See DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION:

STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL

SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION

7 (2002)

("[Jludicial election campaigns pose a substantial threat to judicial independence and
impartiality, and undermine public trust in the judicial system."). See generally SARA
MATHIAS, Am. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, ELECTING JUSTICE 13-62 (1990) (discussing common

problems in the election ofjudges, including an uninformed electorate, problematic judicial
campaign materials, improper political activity by judges, and campaign finance issues).
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(if not in judicial disciplinary commissions) is the extent to which judges
independently research factual and policy information on the Internet to help
decide a case. While the ability of a judge to research factual information
may not seem problematic to outsiders, it does pose significant problems in
an adversarial legal system designed to restrain the exercise ofjudicial power
and make the parties entirely responsible for the introduction of evidence.
As one scholar put it:
[T]he adversarial ideal is inextricably connected to the popular view that
courts should play a limited role in a democratic society; it both ensures that
courts do not exceed their proper role and provides them with a means of
filling that role well. 133

When research and fact-finding occur on the Internet, outside of the record,
the adversarial process falters, as neither side has a voice in objecting to the
veracity or credibility of whatever "facts" the judge finds online. 13 4 The lack
of adversarial testing when a judge draws his or her own conclusions from
factual information found on the Internet is also concerning in the "fake
news" era when the provenance of information on the Internet may be
questionable.
The ethical issues surrounding outside Internet research by judges have
different applications when considering the work of trial judges and appellate
judges. For trial courts, who may serve as the finders of fact (unless it is a
jury trial), the general rule is that judges may not conduct independent
research on "adjudicative" facts personal to the parties or litigation, although
they may research and cite "legislative facts" relative to legal research and
analysis.135 Even when taking judicial notice of an incontestable fact, there
is often a requirement to give notice and an opportunity to be heard.1 3 6

133. Brianne J. Gorod, The AdversarialMyth: Appellate Court Extra-RecordFacfinding,
61 DUKE L.J. 1, 13 (2011).
134. David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, JudicialEthics and the Internet: May Judges
Search the Internet in Evaluatingand Decidinga Case?, 16 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2005, at 2, 1416 (describing concerns ofjudicial use of the internet as raising questions of accuracy, fairness
and permanency of materials found at one time).
135. Gorod, supra note 133, at 39-40 (describing "adjudicative facts" as those specific
and relevant to the parties and the issues to be decided, whereas legislative facts deal with
general information, such as important background information, legislative history, or
generalized data and studies); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The CuriousAppellate Judge:
Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 149-53 (2008) (describing
history of and meaning of adjudicative versus legislative facts). But see RICHARD A. POsNER,
REFLECTIONS ON JuDGrNG 136-37 (2013) (describing four categories of "facts" in litigationadjudicative facts, legislative facts, incontestable facts that can be judicially noticed, and
background facts).
136. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 135, at 158 (noting that while a judge may take
judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute, the Federal Rules of Evidence
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Trial judges who have sought out information on the Internet about the
parties are particularly in danger of disciplinary action or reversal. For
example, the North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission publicly
reprimanded a judge for visiting the website of the mother in a custody
dispute and then citing a poem he found there in the custody hearing. 137 The
public reprimand concluded that the judge's independent Internet research
implicated all of the core values of the judiciary, including failing to
personally observe appropriate standards of conduct to promote public
confidence in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the courts. 138
Similarly, in NYC Medical & Neurodiagnostic, P.C. v. Republic Western
Insurance, an appellate court reversed a trial judge's decision to dismiss a
case based on his independent Internet research into the defendant's business
operations in New York. 140
When appellate judges independently research factual issues on the
Internet, the issues are different and several. Independent research by
appellate judges is not a new problem. One early article on the topic found
that in one state supreme court's opinions, 40% of the empirical research
cited in the court's opinions derived from independent research by justices
and not through presentation by the parties during the fact-finding process in
the trial courts. 1 4 1 More recently, Justices of the United States Supreme
Court have faced scrutiny and criticism for citing facts found through online
resources or presented in amicus briefs rather than found in the record from
the trial court where facts are subjected to the adversarial process and notice
provisions. 14 2 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Sykes

provide that the parties have the right to respond to anyjudicially noticed facts and may appeal
the issue of whether judicial notice is appropriate).
137. Public Reprimand of Hon. B. Carlton Terry, Jr., Inquiry No. 08-234, at 2-3 (N.C.
Judicial Standards Comm'n April 1, 2009).
138. Id. at 4.
139. NYC Med. & Neurodiagnostic, P.C. v. Republic W. Ins., 798 N.Y.S.2d 309 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004).
140. Id. at 313.
141. Thornburg, supra note 135, at 138 (citing THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS
AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 174 (1978)).

142. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV.
1901, 1906 (2016) (noting the Supreme Court's "new hunger for information outside the
record" that can be found in amicus briefs); Allison Orr Larsen, ConfrontingSupreme Court
FactFinding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1260-61 (2012) (discussing how "[s]ocial science studies,
raw statistics, and other data are all just a Google search away" from the Justices and their
law clerks and that such legislative facts are often cited in Court opinions or raised at oral
argument).
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v. UnitedStates, "Supreme Court briefs are an inappropriate place to develop
the key facts in a case."' 43
The problem of judicial use of Internet resources by appellate judges is
also particularly intractable because it is generally not subject to review in
the way that a trial court order citing an Internet resource (even if judicially
noticed) could be appealed. Given the extraordinary rise in the number of
amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court, which often contain non-vetted
"expert" factual opinions,' 44 there is an opportunity for Internet resources of
dubious provenance to make their way into judicial decision making without
adversarial testing. Moreover, "facts" on websites can change. For example,
Chief Justice John Roberts was recently criticized for citing information
from an Arizona state website during oral argument and later having to note
in the opinion itself that the website information had changed.' 5
The controversy involving independent Internet research has also
gained traction in part because of the attention given to the issue by Judge
Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
For example, in Rowe v. Gibson, which involved a pro se prisoner claiming
deliberate indifference to his medical needs, Judge Posner, in the majority
opinion, referenced various websites, including Wikipedia and WebMD, to
provide background facts on the medical condition and medications in issue,
as well as to evaluate the propriety of the prison doctor's treatment and the
doctor's professional background and reputation.1 46 In defending his resort
to Internet research to determine whether summary judgment in favor of the
prison was appropriate, Judge Posner cited two primary concerns. First, he
143. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 31 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We normally
give parties more robust protection, leaving important factual questions to district courts and
juries aided by expert witnesses and the procedural protections of discovery. An adversarial
process in the trial courts can identify flaws in the methodology of the studies that the parties
put forward; here, we accept the studies' findings on faith, without examining their
methodology at all." (citation omitted)).
144. See Larsen & Devins, supra note 142, at 1921 (discussing the belief among the
Supreme Court that "one could not win a Supreme Court case without assembling a portfolio
of 'Brandeis briefs' from historians, social scientists, physicians, and other individuals who
could impart their expertise to the Court as amici.").
145. See Dahlia Lithwick, Supreme Court Year in Review, SLATE (June 27, 2011, 6:17
PM), https://perma.cc/3BCE-GYLP (noting a problem that arose when Chief Justice Roberts
cited a state website for information during oral arguments regarding the state's reason for
adopting certain campaign finance restrictions when the website was later changed to identify
a different reason for the legislation-a point that was raised in the Chief Justice's opinion).
146. Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2015). When discussing the possible
credibility of information found on corporate websites, Judge Posner also noted that "[i]t
might be thought that a corporate website ... would be a suspect source of information. Not
so; the manufacturer would be taking grave risks if it misrepresented the properties of its
product." Id at 626.
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argued that strict adherence to the adversarial process is not always
beneficial to serve the interests of justice, especially in cases involving pro
se litigants.147 Second, he asserted that the types of facts he researched on
the Internet were not necessarily adjudicatory facts requiring the presence of
a testifying witness.' 48 In a strong dissent, Judge David Hamilton noted that
The ease of research on the internet has given new life to an old debate
about the propriety of and limits to independent factual research by appellate
courts.... By any measure, however, using independent factual research to
find a genuine issue of material, adjudicative fact, and thus to decide an
49
appeal, falls outside permissible boundaries.1

With the contentious debate among judges about the ethical propriety
of searching the web for factual information useful to a case, the issue of
outside independent research on the Internet has become a major concern for
the American Bar Association. Under Rule 2.9(C) of the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge shall not investigate facts in a matter
independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts
that may properly be judicially noticed."' 50 The comment to this rule makes
clear that the prohibition extends to information available electronically.'
Additionally, the American Bar Association also issued a rare judicial ethics
opinion interpreting the Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically to
address independent research on the Internet, even when seeking to judicially
notice a fact. As stated in Formal Opinion 478:
[A] judge should not gather adjudicative facts from any source on the
Internet unless the information is subject to proper judicial notice. Further[,]
... judges should not use the Internet for independent fact-gathering related
to a pending or impending matter where the parties can easily be asked to
52
research or provide the information.1

147. Id at 630 ("It is heartless to make a fetish of adversary procedure if by doing so feeble
evidence is credited because the opponent has no practical access to offsetting evidence.").
148. Id. at 628. Judge Posner described a number of scenarios where he felt Internet
research of facts is appropriate, such as web searches for background information and facts
that can be judicially noticed. Id Even so, Judge Posner wrote:
When medical information can be gleaned from the websites of highly reputable
medical centers, it is not imperative that it instead be presented by a testifying
witness. Such information tends to fall somewhere between facts that require
adversary procedure to determine and facts of which a court can take judicial
notice ....
Id. See also Posner, supra note 135, at 134-43 (discussing the benefits of Internet use by
judges to research facts and background information in decision making).
149. Id. at 638 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
150. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r 2.9(C) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2007).

151. Id.r 2.9 cmt. 6.
152. ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 478, at 11 (2017).
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When considering how independent Internet research by judges
threatens the core values of independence, integrity, and impartiality in the
judiciary, the harm is sometimes less obvious than when a judge makes
profane or outrageous statements on social media or communicates with
attorneys through Facebook. Even so, the proliferation of information
available instantly on the Internet raises significant concerns about
maintaining public trust and confidence in the judiciary. Internet research of
facts, like all forms of independent factual research by judges, is considered
a form of ex parte communication because it occurs outside the presence of
the parties and without an opportunity to cross-examine or object to its use.
Reliance on independent Internet research, like all ex parte communications,
is prohibited because it can "undermine the adversarial system, threaten
fairness of the proceeding, and create an appearance of bias and
impartiality.""' With respect to the core value of impartiality, the curious
judge may wish to Google a party or find background information only to
stumble upon unfavorable information that could explicitly or implicitly
prejudice the judge towards a litigant or lawyer. 15 4 Similarly, a judge may
develop strong opinions or conclusions on disputed factual issues germane
to the case when researching "background" information regarding an issue
presented to the court for adjudication."'
Another significant problem with independent Internet research by
judges is that it is harder to police and deter. Unlike social media use, which
makes a judge's conduct visible to a broad number of people, it is difficult
to discover when a judge visits a website to gather information about a party
or a case unless the information is noted in open courtl 5 6 or cited in an
opinion.' 57

Like all challenges facing the courts, however, the judiciary and the
legal profession have shown institutional prerogatives to quickly address
internal problems that can draw negative political or media attention. This
responsiveness is premised not only on a consistent desire to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary but also a concomitant desire to preserve judicial
independence. With both the high-profile nature of social media misconduct
and the low-profile nature of independent Internet research, the courts and
the ABA have demonstrated an ongoing commitment to preservation of the
153. GARWINETAL., supra note 73, at 195.
154. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the "root" meaning of
impartiality as a lack of bias against a party).
155. See supra note 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of "openmindedness" as a component of impartiality).
156. See Public Reprimand of Hon. B. Carlton Terry, Jr., Inquiry No. 08-234 (N.C.
Judicial Standards Comm'n April 1, 2009).
157. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing Rowe decision).
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independence, integrity, and impartiality of the courts through advisory
opinions, rule changes, working groups, and, when warranted, disciplinary
actions against judges.
II1. LESSONS FROM THE WATERGATE ERA: PROMOTING PUBLIC
CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY

When looking back at the tremendous impact of the Watergate scandal
on the development and use of independent prosecutors and the increased
focus on legal ethics, it is easy to forget that this same period of time saw
monumental changes in how judges are held accountable for misconduct in
office. These changes, and the reforms necessitated by Watergate, took place
amidst a background of extraordinary political and social division, much as
we see today.' 58 Writing in the late 1960s and lamenting the lack of adequate
rules and mechanisms to discipline judicial misconduct, Professor Arthur
Miller noted that maintaining public confidence in the courts is especially
important when the judiciary "is required to act at a time when polarization
is occurring over a number of fundamental goals of the American people,
and ... during a period of the most rapid social change in history."' 5 9
Prompted by the civil unrest, social revolution, and scandals of the 1960s
and 1970s, palpable concerns about continued confidence in the courts as a
bedrock of the rule of law translated into extraordinary changes in the
substantive rules of judicial ethics and accountability.
Like the 1960s and 1970s, the politics and social changes of today have
sparked widespread feelings of division and distrust in our government
institutions. Social media and the Internet have fueled that divide while also
providing extraordinary advances in efficiency in government and greater
communication. In such times, public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the courts is especially important. Although
comprehensive ethical guidelines and effective enforcement mechanisms
cannot entirely insulate the judiciary from political and public criticism, the
norms of judicial ethics must constantly be adapted to address emerging
problems that threaten public confidence in the courts. What Watergate and
the Justice Fortas scandal teach us, however, is that not all responses to
particular ethics problems are effective in deterring political intervention in
the sensitive field ofjudicial discipline or generally bolstering the perception
158. See, e.g, Joseph P. Williams, A Year to Be Forgotten, U.S. NEwS (July 22, 2016,
6:00 AM), https://perma.ccl8BE8-8H9F(comparing political strife, civil rights, and war
protests of 1968 to the present-day movement of Black Lives Matter, the deeply partisan
political divide, and the controversial nature of Donald Trump's campaign and populist
rhetoric).
159. Miller, supra note 19, at 76.
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of fair and impartial courts. At the same time, the response to the Justice
Fortas scandal also shows the imperative in addressing judicial misconduct
in ways other than government ethics restrictions. To date, the courts, the
ABA, and the legal profession have been quick to address problems in the
courts, not just in the area of social media and the Internet, but in other areas
such as the election of judges160 and the problem of implicit bias."' From
these considerations, several lessons emerge in evaluating appropriate
responses to ethical issues arising from social media and Internet use by
judges.
First, judges must willingly accept that the restrictions on their conduct
on and off the bench are going to be much more burdensome than those
imposed on other public officials.162 This is true even in jurisdictions that
elect their judges. In exchange for the respect, power, and authority that
come with the robe, judges must understand that public perception of their
behavior can impugn the public's overall confidence in the independence,
impartiality, and integrity of the judiciary. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote in her dissent in Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White,
[J]udges perform a function fundamentally different from that of the people's
elected representatives. Legislative and executive officials act on behalf of
the voters who placed them in office .... Unlike their counterparts in the
political branches, judges are expected to refrain from catering to particular
constituencies or committing themselves on controversial issues in advance
of adversarial presentation. Their mission is to decide "individual cases and
controversies" on individual records, neutrally applying legal principles ....
A judiciary capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to no person
or party, is . .. an essential bulwark of constitutional government, a constant
guardian of the rule of law. 163
Accordingly, there are compelling reasons for putting strict limitations on
how judges interact on social media platforms or utilize information found
on the Internet in the adjudicatory process. As discussed in Part II, those
160. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., N.C. COMnvi'N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, supranote 20, at 68 (citing
polling data showing that a large percentage of respondents believe that African Americans
and non-English-speaking people receive worse treatment in the courts than white people);
JERRY KANG, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 6 (2009)
("It is the primary responsibility of the judge and other court staff to manage this complex
and bias-rich social situation to the end that fairness and justice be done-and be seen to be
done."). See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Hon. Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (discussing an empirical study of implicit
bias in the courts and suggestions for steps to address these impulses).
162. See THODE, supra note 74.
163. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803-04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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activities can easily affect ajudge's impartiality, call into question ajudge's
integrity, or-otherwise undermine faith in the fairness of the administration
ofjustice. Thus, while hyper-partisan or shocking language on social media
may be the new norm in political rhetoric, and while using dubious
information from the Internet may play a role in supporting political goals or
campaigns, such conduct for judges must continue to be strictly regulated.
Second, as in the post-Justice Fortas context, the judiciary and the legal
profession must quickly address internal problems to protect judicial
independence and avoid political responses to perceived judicial misconduct.
At the same time, however, courts and judicial policy makers must be careful
not to act too hastily to adopt prophylactic or unworkable rules that unduly
burden legitimate judicial conduct or social interaction. For example, in
dealing with the contemporary threats to public confidence in the
administration ofjustice arising in the digital age, some states moved quickly
to adopt draconian restrictions on social media use.1 64 Rather than entirely
restrict a judge's use of social media to connect with their communities,
which includes lawyers, the focus of judicial ethics regulation is more
appropriately placed on fostering responsible use of technology. This
includes using social media in a way that minimizes conflicts of interest,
avoids ex parte communications, and refrains from inflammatory or
inappropriate commentary that calls into question the integrity or
impartiality of the judge as an individual or the courts as a whole.
Third, judicial ethics rules relating to social media and the Internet
should not deter judges from stepping into the digital frontier. Social media
engagement and technology can have many benefits for enhancing public
understanding of the courts. 165 The use of social media in particular, is
extremely useful because of the "unprecedented need for judges to respond
with educational efforts that will ameliorate the public's misconceptions
about the justice system and strengthen its commitment to an independent
judiciary." 166 Judges may also need to use social media to effectively
campaign for judicial office. Encouraging judges to interact with technology
is also increasingly important as courts transition to e-courts and other digital
platforms to promote efficiency and transparency. We also cannot ignore
the fact that we live in an age where young people, and future judges, interact
electronically in ways that are hard to understand by the older generations
that can often dominate judicial policy making, which is already by its nature
164. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g, Justice Barbara A. Jackson, To Follow or Not to Follow: The Brave New
World of Social Media, 53 JUDGES J., no. 4, 2014, at 12 (arguing for greater user of social
media by judges, but cautioning that restraint in posting and use of best practices are necessary
to ensure a judge is not perceived as biased based on the content of social media posts).
166.

CYNTA GRAY, STATE JUSTICE INST., WHEN JUDGES SPEAK UP 1(1998).
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restrained and cautious. Attracting talented, smart, and tech-savvy lawyers
to the bench is, therefore, another consideration that must be taken into
account in developing rules that regulate social media and internet use by
judges.
Finally, without embracing Judge Posner's full-throated support for
increased Internet research by appellate judges, judicial policy makers
should take note of the serious impact that the rise of pro se litigation has on
public confidence in the courts. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, today more and
more people are choosing to represent themselves in court, 16 7 which has
caused a host of issues for the administration ofjustice. Among other things,
this has created a strong perception that the poor and those without attorneys
are not treated fairly. As noted in a poll included in the Final Report of the
North Carolina Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice, 76%
of respondents believed that self-represented litigants receive worse or far
worse treatment in the courts than litigants with lawyers. 168 This dismal
figure harkens to an observation by Professor Arthur Miller about the state
of the judiciary in the pre-Model Code days of the late 1960s: "[I]n our
adversary system of justice wherein truth is secondary to the skill and
connections of the advocate-the logical culmination of this ethic, on a
person-to-person level, is that the weak are seen as the natural and just prey
of the strong.",69 Social media activity by judges can exacerbate the feeling
of weakness and unfairness for the rising number of pro se litigants in the
courts, especially as the bench and bar become more visibly interconnected
through Linkedln, Facebook, and other platforms. Similarly, pro se litigants
facing represented opponents may have significant disadvantages in
gathering evidence electronically (or otherwise) or, conversely, in presenting
the electronic evidence that they do have. At the same time, judges must
avoid overreaching to try to "help" such litigants (for instance by researching
factual issues on the Internet for them), which could be prohibited as the
practice of law and would be unfair to the opposing party.
Looking back at the post-Watergate era, the modern rules of judicial
ethics and judicial disciplinary structures were implemented during a period
of unprecedented attention to ethics in government. Even so, the ethical rules
of the 1970s and today reflect continued commitment to the three core values
of the judiciary-independence, integrity, and impartiality. While specific
rules have been adopted over the ensuing decades to address particular
problems, a less restrictive approach to social media and the Internet is
167. See MADELYNNHIERMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRO SE STATISTICS (2006)
(compiling data and statistics from state court systems showing percentage of pro se litigants
rising over time).
168. See N.C. COMM'N ON THE ADMIN. OF LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 68.
169. Miller, supranote 19, at 86 (quoting E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 85 (1968)).
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realities of modem

communication with rules that focus on restricting the type of conduct or
statements that threaten the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the
particular judge is more likely to yield positive results for public confidence
in the courts than harsh digital restrictions. In particular, regulated use of the
Internet under existing standards ofjudicial ethics is more likely to comport
with First Amendment protections, accommodate judges who must
campaign for office, enhance judicial outreach to younger generations,
promote the use of new technologies to improve case management and
administration, and otherwise attract and retain new judges who rely on
social media and other technologies in their personal and professional lives.
CONCLUSION

At the end of the day, each new challenge in the area of judicial ethics
since Watergate has been addressed with rules that continue to promote the
core values necessary to preserve public confidence in the courts. As modes
of communication change and norms of civil discourse disintegrate, we must
continue to demand restraint, fairness, and excellence in our judiciary. As
put by William Taft not long before he became Chief Justice of the United
States:
The proper discharge of the difficult duties of courts requires as judges men
of great ability, wide experience, profound learning, independence and force
of character, of nice discriminating judicial quality, and with the
statesmanlike perception of the distinction between those fundamental
principles of law that must be constantly maintained and preserved in any
useful system of government and of the casual and temporary rules of human
conduct that may be changed from time to time as conditions change ... .1o

Heeding Taft's words, "the casual and temporary rules of human conduct"' 71
that judges have faced from the 1960s to today must always yield to the
fundamental principles of independence, integrity, and impartiality.
Whether such conduct includes receiving annuities and other outside
compensation from organizations, maintaining a close and public
relationship with the President, or connecting with potential voters and
lawyer friends on the Internet, all such activity must be subject to the
restraints on judicial conduct that are necessary to maintain public
confidence in the rule of law and allow the federal and state judiciaries to
continue to take the leading role in judicial discipline.

170. William Howard Taft, The Attacks on the Courts andLegal Procedure,5 KY. L.J. 3,
8(1916).
171. Id
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